The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers by Dorsen, Norman
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 5 Article 4
The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers
Norman Dorsen
Copyright c 1986 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Norman Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 863 (1986),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss5/4
THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND NONBELIEVERS
NORMAN DORSEN*
Initially, I comment on Professor Kurland's introductory quota-
tion from Learned Hand concerning the alleged conflict between
"the advocate with a cause" and "disinterested scholarship."' Pro-
fessor Kurland's Article is built around this conflict, and he quotes
Learned Hand approvingly; yet it is a nice question whether any
scholarship is truly disinterested. It is modest of Professor Kur-
land to say that he often is not disinterested. It is not easy for any
of us to shed our skin-what Justice Holmes is reputed to have
called "our can't helps." Some of us may be more overt or less sub-
tle than others, but I have yet to find the disinterested law profes-
sor or judge. Justice Felix Frankfurter, at whose knee Professor
Kurland sat as a law clerk, was especially prone to exalt disinter-
estedness as a judicial standard. But if one needs proof of the elu-
siveness of the goal, one need only consider Justice Frankfurter's
energetic and "interested" public career while he was in academic
life2 or, with particular reference to the subject of this Symposium,
compare his judicial opinions under the establishment clause with
his opinions concerning free speech.'
Professor Kurland's Article concerns the origins of the religion
clauses of the Constitution. It is a splendid portrayal of the
relevance of history to contemporary issues. In my opinion, the
most important issue that the Article raises is whether
* Stokes Professor of Law, New York University Law School; President, American Civil
Liberties Union.
1. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 839, 839-40 (1986) (quoting L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LMERTY 138 (I. Dilliard 3d ed.
1974)).
2. See LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913-1938 (A. Mac-
leish & E. Prichard, Jr. eds. 1939).
3. I have discussed this inconsistency in Dorsen, Book Review, 95 HARv. L. REv. 367, 380-
81 (1981) (reviewing H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981)). Justice Frank-
furter's judicial approach is discussed thoughtfully in Danzig, Justice Frankfurter's Opin-
ions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending Logic and Psychologic in Constitutional Decision-
making, 36 STAN. L. REV. 675 (1984).
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nonbelievers-atheists, secular humanists, and agnostics-are pro-
tected by the religion clauses. While partly a historical question, it
is also an extremely important issue for contemporary American
society. Indeed, it has been important for generations. One need
merely recall the Scopes case,4 when the struggle over the teaching
of Darwinian evolution led to the American Civil Liberties Union's
first major case.5
During the early 1950's, the frequent refrain of many people, in-
cluding some who should have known better, was that our enemies
were "godless Communists."6 The epithet, incidentally, often was
uttered as one word-"godlesscommunists." Today's Moral Major-
ity descends from that dubious ancestry, as well as from the anti-
Darwinianism of the late nineteenth century.
Some national leaders stoke the fires, perhaps unwittingly.
About two or three years ago President Reagan was asked at a
news conference: "What is it, Mr. President, that separates us from
our adversaries? Why are we different from the Communists?" Mr.
Reagan responded, "Because we believe in God." He did not say
because we have a great tradition of freedom in the United States,
or because of our Nation's memorable achievements in the arts and
sciences. He said we believe in God. What about the tens of mil-
lions of Americans who do not believe in God? 7 Jimmy Carter also
must be faulted for encouraging White House "photo opportuni-
ties" while he prayed on his knees. Of course, Presidents enjoy the
4. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
5. The current controversy about the teaching of "creation science" is evidence that the
issue remains alive. See Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), prob. juris.
noted, 106 S. Ct. 1946 (1986); see also 55 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1986) (summary of
oral argument).
6. George V. Higgins recently reminded us of this history by recalling that the late Rich-
ard Cardinal Cushing, Archbishop of Boston, had inveighed against "atheistic, socialistic,
godless Communism." Higgins, Challenging the Kennedy "Magic", N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1986, at 22, col. 4.
7. On another occasion, President Reagan suggested: "[Plolitics and morality are insepa-
rable. And as morality's foundation is religion, religion and politics are necessarily related."
N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1984, at All, col. 6. President Reagan's comment led the New York
Times to respond editorially that "Mr. Reagan has exceeded the bounds of tolerable de-
bate." N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1984, at A22, col. 1.
Note that not all of the political forces injecting religion into politics come from the con-
servative right; "they come from the left as well. Witness the campaign of the Reverend
Jesse Jackson." Lowrieg, Book Review, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 255, 259 (1986).
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free exercise of religion, but it was apparent that Mr. Carter was
seeking beneficial political fallout from public demonstration of his
Southern Baptist faith.
The issue is accented at present. For example, in 1984, during
consideration of the Education for Economic Security Act,8 Con-
gress initially included a ban on the teaching of secular humanism
in schools given federal aid under the Act.' Congress quietly
dropped this provision when the Act was extended, 10 but the mes-
sage was clear. Other examples could be cited to give concrete
point to Professor Nichol's opening remarks. I am speaking of the
fact, and I regretfully do not hesitate to use the word "fact," that
the religious right's agenda, if consummated, would sharply curtail
American liberty. Among other things, that agenda would censor
library books, introduce government-sponsored prayer in public
schools, outlaw abortion, and reduce enforcement of laws prohibit-
ing discrimination against racial minorities, women, and gay peo-
ple.1 The gains of a generation, and more, could be swiftly erased.
Whether nonbelievers are protected by the religion clauses is a
serious matter for the vast number of Americans who never have
been able to persuade themselves, often despite heroic effort, that
there is a deity-an active god. Can there be doubt about the
prejudice against professed atheists? What would be the reaction
at a PTA meeting in Cincinnati or Tulsa if a parent began a
speech by saying, "I don't believe in God, but. . . ."? Are career
promotions at Exxon, IBM, and Westinghouse unconnected to
a person's churchgoing habits? Are teachers in Savannah and
Wichita and Manchester hired wholly without regard to their
8. Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1267 (1984) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3901-
3915, 3921-3923, 3961-4074 (West Supp. 1986)).
9. Section 709 of the Act, as initially passed, provided: "Grants under this title may not
be used for consultants, for transportation, or for any activity which does not augment aca-
demic improvement, or for the courses of instruction the substance of which is secular hu-
manism." Pub. L. No. 98-377, § 706, 98 Stat. 1267, 1301 (1984) (codified at 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 4059 (West Supp. 1985)). This provision was amended in 1985 to drop the language con-
cerning secular humanism. National Science, Engineering, and Mathematics Authorization
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-159, § 264, 99 Stat. 887, 902 (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 4059
(West Supp. 1986)).
10. See EDUCATION WEEK, Nov. 6, 1985, at 11, col. 4; supra note 9.
11. The National Coalition Against Censorship in New York City maintains a complete
file of such instances.
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membership in the community of the Judeo-Christian heritage?
The matters I have referred to relate to both public and private
discrimination. We may be living through a new sort of McCarthy-
ism, except unfortunately it is not so new. In many parts of the
country there has long been deep antagonism toward those who
announce that they do not believe in God or in the kind of god
that most Americans profess to worship.
Professor Kurland's Article says that no evidence indicates that
the Framers were concerned with freedom for irreligion; it was
man's relation to his god for which they sought protection.12 As-
suming this is true, what should we infer? Professor Kurland is
ambivalent. On the one hand, he criticizes Mark DeWolfe Howe,
correctly in my view, for endorsing a limited, "evangelical" separa-
tion of church and state.'" On the other hand, he also observed in
an early draft of his Article, with a dash of humor, that in a world
where the tenets of neither Richard Posner nor Duncan Kennedy
hold sway, "mindlessness is second only to godlessness."" This
metaphor casts light on the standing of godlessness. Professor Kur-
land's ambivalence is dissipated only partially by his welcome con-
clusion that it is desirable to keep government out of religion and
religion out of government. 5
How do we resolve the uncertainty about the status of nonbe-
lievers under the religion clauses? The Attorney General would
rely, apparently exclusively, on the Framers' original intention. In
a speech to the American Bar Association, Mr. Meese prescribed a
"jurisprudence of original intention" that would accept the original
meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes as the only re-
liable guide for judgment. 16 This approach would lock into our
12. Kurland, supra note 1, at 856.
13. Id. at 856-57. Professor Howe's work, published in 1965, continues to be influential, as
Dean Gerety's recent discussion shows. Gerety, Book Review, 38 STAN. L. REV. 595 (1986)
(reviewing M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965)).
14. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution 3 (Mar. 29, 1986)
(unpublished manuscript).
15. Kurland, supra note 1, at 858-59.
16. Address by Edwin Meese to the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., at 17
(July 9, 1985).
Mr. Meese's interpretive theory was met with a barrage of hostile comment, including
statements by two Supreme Court justices. The Constitution of the United States:
[Vol. 27:863
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Constitution meanings based on a spurious specificity of the Fram-
ers' intent. Among other deficiencies, it would run counter to John
Marshall's never-contradicted assertion that the Constitution was
not frozen in time, but instead was an instrument "intended to en-
dure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the vari-
ous crises of human affairs. 17 Further, as Professor Kurland rec-
ognizes, evidence of different meanings can be garnered for almost
every disputable proposition, especially if we look for authority not
only to the delegates to the 1787 Convention but also to those who
attended the state ratifying conventions and the First Congress.""
"Original intention" cannot solve the problem of constitutional
interpretation.
Instead, we must turn, as the Supreme Court has so often, to the
purposes of the clause at issue, and to the values that underlie it.
This approach is consistent with established constitutional theory.
If one considers the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, one finds no historical evidence that it was designed
to protect women, aliens, or extramarital children;1 9 yet the
Contemporary Ratification, Address by Justice Brennan at Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 12, 1985); Address by Justice Stevens to the Federal Bar Associa-
tion, Chicago, I1. (Oct. 23, 1985); The Role of Advice and Consent in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, Address by Senator Biden to the Georgetown University Law Center, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Nov. 6, 1985); see Schwartz, Meese's 'Original Intent': A Constitutional Shell
Game, THE NATION, Dec. 7, 1985, at 607.
17. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis in original); see
also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921) ("The great generalities of
the constitution have a content and a significance that vary from age to age."); W. WILSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1908) ("[T]he Constitution of the
United States is not a mere lawyers' document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always
the spirit of the age.").
18. Kurland, supra note 1, at 841. Evidence of a desire to protect individuals other than
theists through the first amendment also exists. As Jefferson observed, his Act for Establish-
ing Religious Freedom "was meant to be universal ... to comprehend within the mantle of
its protection the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and
infidel of every denomination. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION
133 n.1 (W. Blakely rev. enl. ed. 1911) (emphasis in original).
19. Indeed, after a comprehensive analysis, Professor Bickel wrote that the "obvious con-
clusion to which the evidence, thus summarized, easily leads is that section I of the four-
teenth amendment .... as originally understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service,
nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segregation." Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955). Consistent with the
analysis of the religion clauses proposed here, Bickel recognized that the "congressional un-
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Supreme Court applies heightened scrutiny to legislation that dis-
criminates against these groups because evolving views of equality,
consistent with the constitutional text and with the purposes of
the equal protection clause, demand it.2 0
Similarly, the core purpose of the religion clauses applies to
nonbelievers as well as to believers. The key objective in both situ-
ations is to safeguard minorities and outsiders with respect to reli-
gious beliefs-an objective consonant with the overriding goal of
the Bill of Rights to protect vulnerable groups in American society,
thereby assuring that there are no outsiders in our polity. This
principle has special force with regard to the religion clauses,
which were designed to eliminate religious persecution and strife.2 1
Justice Stewart made the point comprehensively while dissenting
in Abington School District v. Schempp:22
What our Constitution indispensably protects is the freedom
of each of us, be he Jew or Agnostic, Christian or Atheist, Budd-
hist or Freethinker, to believe or disbelieve, to worship or not
worship, to pray or keep silent, according to his own conscience,
uncoerced and unrestrained by government."3
Thus, Professor Kurland correctly concludes that we can be con-
fident of the intended direction of the first amendment: "the en-
hancement of individual freedom" and the establishment of "an
equality among persons."24 But he also says that the objective of
that equality was to permit each individual to "choose without in-
terference how to commune with his god."'2 5 Once again, ambiva-
derstanding" was not dispositive as to the "long-range effect, under future circumstances, of
provisions necessarily intended for permanence." Id. at 59.
20. The leading cases are Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971), in the area of sex discrimination; In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), and Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), in the area of alienage; and Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977), and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), in the area of extramarital
children.
21. See, e.g., Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. RaV. 1680, 1692 (1969),
cited in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
22. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
23. Id. at 319-20; see also Dorsen & Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An Error in Judg-
ment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 837, 856-61 (deploring the Court's insensitivity to the purpose of
the religion clauses in upholding town's purchase and public display of creche at Christmas).
24. Kurland, supra note 1, at 860.
25. Id.
868 [Vol. 27:863
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lence. What about people who choose not to commune with a
"god" in identifying their deepest values and faith? Justice Robert
Jackson, in one of the most seminal passages in American constitu-
tional law, wrote that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion. '26 There is no more important constitutional value.
I am reminded of Isaiah Berlin's essay, The Hedgehog and the
Fox,27 in which the fox knew many things but the hedgehog knew
one big thing. The big thing here is the necessity and justice of
protecting all minorities and dissenters in their conscientious be-
liefs relating to religion. There should be little doubt under this
standard that nonbelievers, outsiders par excellence, deserve con-
stitutional protection. Or as Justice Jackson said in another con-
nection, "I had not supposed that the rights of secular and non-
religious communications were more narrow or in any way inferior
to those of avowed religious groups. '2 Similarly, in terms of insti-
tutional function, it is the federal judiciary's special province, rela-
tively insulated as it is from majoritarian political control for this
very purpose,29 to protect those who adhere to minority religions or
who do not profess a religion.
A model analysis is Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh
v. United States.30 In that case, the petitioner had been convicted
of refusing to submit for induction into the Armed Forces despite
his claim of conscientious objector status under section 6(j) of the
Selective Service Act of 1948.31 That provision exempted from mil-
itary service persons who by reason of "religious training and be-
lief, [were] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
26. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (emphasis
added).
27. I. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox (1953).
28. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring). For a
probing discussion of the relationship between religious and nonreligious speech, see Mans-
field, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitu-
tion, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 847, 852-56 (1984). See generally Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1072-83 (1978) (arguing that the protections
of the free exercise clause should be extended broadly).
29. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see Neuborne,
The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 & n.45, 1127-28 (1977).
30. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
31. Ch. 625, tit. I, 62 Stat. 604 (as amended by the Universal Military Training and Ser-
vice Act, ch. 144, tit. I, § 1, 65 Stat. 75, 86 (1951)).
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form." 32 "Religious training and belief' was defined in the Act as
"belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation" but not including "es-
sentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code." 3 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit had affirmed the conviction, concluding that the
petitioner's beliefs were not sufficiently "religious" to fall within
section 6(). 34 The Supreme Court reversed. Four justices, following
United States v. Seeger,3 5 interpreted section 6(j) to mean that a
registrant's conscientious objection to all war was "religious" if his
beliefs were held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions. 6
Justice Harlan, concurring, first concluded that section 6(j) could
not be construed properly as exempting from military service all
those who in good faith opposed all war. In his view, textual analy-
sis and legislative history proved that Congress used the words "by
reason of religious training and belief" to limit religion to its theis-
tic sense. 7 Accordingly, he had to face the constitutional question
"whether a statute that defers to the individual's conscience only
when his views emanate from adherence to theistic religious beliefs
is within the power of Congress. '3 8 Justice Harlan stated:
The "radius" of this legislation is the conscientiousness with
which an individual opposes war in general, yet the statute, as I
think it must be construed, excludes from its "scope" individu-
als motivated by teachings of nontheistic religions, and individu-
als guided by an inner ethical voice that bespeaks secular and
not "religious" reflection. It not only accords a preference to the
"religious" but also disadvantages adherents of religions that do
32. Id., tit. I, § 6(j), 62 Stat. at 612.
33. Id., 62 Stat. at 613. The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81
Stat. 100, amended the Universal Military Training and Service Act by deleting the refer-
ence to a "Supreme Being," but the 1967 Act continued to provide that "religious training
and belief" did not include "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code." Id. § 7, 81 Stat. at 104 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 4560) (1982)).
34. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
35. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
36. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340-44.
37. Id. at 345-54 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 356.
870 [Vol. 27:863
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not worship a Supreme Being. The constitutional infirmity can-
not be cured, moreover, even by an impermissible construction
that eliminates the theistic requirement and simply draws the
line between religious and nonreligious. This in my view offends
the Establishment Clause and is that kind of classification that
this Court has condemned. 39
Nonbelievers are protected by the religion clauses of the Consti-
tution not because secular humanism is a religion, which it is not,
but because when the government acts on the basis of religion
it discriminates against those who do not "believe" in the
governmentally-favored manner. In considering this issue, one
should recall the grand tradition of humanism in Western civiliza-
tion. Professor Graeme Forbes of Tulane University recently did so
in responding to a statement by Secretary of Education William
Bennett that "[o]ur values as a free people and the central values
of the Judeo-Christian tradition are flesh of the flesh and blood of
the blood."4 0 Professor Forbes wrote:
Evidently, the Secretary thinks there is an intimate relation-
ship between our values and those of that tradition, but most of
his former colleagues [as a professional philosopher] would greet
39. Id. at 357-58 (footnote and citations omitted). Welsh demonstrates that the issue of
protecting nonbelievers under the religion clauses has bite. In some cases, the free speech
clause of the first amendment provides all the protection that is necessary, see, e.g., West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634-36 (1943), but, as Welsh demon-
strates, that will not universally be the case. Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)
(requirement that state officials declare their belief in the existence of God violates art. VI,
cl. 3 prohibition against a "religious Test" as a "Qualification to any Office").
By the same token, as the Court stated in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), "the State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe.'" Id. at 225 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314
(1952)). It is difficult to see how this standard easily can be met, and it has been rejected
regularly-in Zorach and Schempp, for example, and most recently in Commonwealth v.
Snider, No. 83M293 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 1983), appeal petition denied mem., No. 840377
(Va. Nov. 21, 1984), appeal denied mem., 106 S. Ct. 2911 (1986) (fine for violating state
compulsory attendance laws upheld against claim that public schools establish religion of
secularism). For useful discussions, see J. SWOMLEY, RELIGious LMERTY AND THE SECULAR
STATE ch. 8 (1987); Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism". Proposed
Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 333 (1986).
40. Rasky, Bennett Vows Aid to Church Schools, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1985, at A18, col. 4
(quoting Secretary Bennett).
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with derision the thesis that there is some conceptual or logical
dependency of moral values or ethical principles upon the theo-
logical doctrines characteristic of the tradition. Stealing and kill-
ing are not wrong because God forbids them; presumably, God
forbids them because they are wrong. The grounds of moral
value do not lie in divine commands.
Perhaps all Dr. Bennett meant was that in some historical or
cultural way, the values that support the institutions of a free
society are derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Among
the central freedoms distinguishing free societies from their op-
posites are freedom of inquiry, of expression and tolerance of a
variety of philosophical, religious and political outlooks. The
idea that we owe such values to the Judeo-Christian tradition is
ludicrous. We owe them to the Enlightenment."'
These words remind us that we in the United States are pluralis-
tic respecting ultimate beliefs. Profound values exist apart from a
devotion to a god. Indeed, those who discriminate against nonbe-
lievers flout the principle of religious tolerance that they often
profess.
For some time I have worn two hats, as a law professor for
twenty-five years, and as president of the ACLU for ten. The
ACLU has been accused of being antireligious. That is not true.
Apart from the presence on our board of directors of ministers and
professors of religion, we have gone to court to defend free exercise
of religion in dozens of cases.42 The overriding principle, as in the
41. Forbes, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1985, at A22, cols. 4-5. It is some-
what reassuring that, some time later, Secretary Bennett observed that "one does not have
to assent to the religious beliefs that are at the heart of our common culture to enjoy its
benefits." In Defense of the Common Culture, Address by Secretary Bennett to the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee, Washington, D.C. (May 15, 1986).
42. E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618
(1978); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Quaring v. Peter-
son, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court per curiam sub nom.
Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985); see also Letter from Rev. Richard C. Halverson,
chaplain for the United States Senate, to William Olds, executive director of the Connecti-
cut Civil Liberties Union (Aug. 1, 1986) (referring to a Washington Post article dated July
27, 1986, which reported that the ACLU had defended "the right of a private citizen in
Stamford, Connecticut, to hold prayer meetings in his home." Rev. Halverson continued:
"As an evangelical, I know that the ACLU is a popular target for criticism, but I personally
believe you have had and will continue to have a great role in the area of human rights and
civil liberty. This is not the first time I have heard of the ACLU becoming an advocate for
people involved in religious issues where their rights were clearly violated.").
[Vol. 27:863
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case of free speech, is that the liberty of all sectors of the commu-
nity must be protected. One part is the religious community, and
we shall continue to protect its rights. But there is another tradi-
tion-the tradition of the Enlightenment, of humanism. The
Constitution requires us to recognize that the religion clauses pro-
tect the heirs to that tradition as well.
